It is generally conceded that the Fed uses open market operations to control the federal funds rate through the "liquidity effect." Open market purchases of government securities drive the funds rate down; open market sales push the funds rate up. The liquidity effect must exist if the demand for reserves is negatively sloped in the funds rate because, in this case, an exogenous change in the supply of reserves will generate a change in the federal funds rate in the opposite direction. Despite the liquidity effect's axiomatic quality, Hamilton (1997) (hereafter, Hamilton) notes that "it is very difficult to find convincing proof that this is indeed what happens." 1 A negatively sloped demand curve is sufficient for the liquidity effect's existence; it does not guarantee that it is large and economically meaningful.
Noting that most attempts at identifying a liquidity effect have used lowfrequency (monthly or quarterly) data, Hamilton suggests that the lack of success in isolating the liquidity effect is due to the fact that, of necessity, low-frequency data mixes together the effect of policy on economic variables with the effect of economic variables on policy. To avoid this problem, Hamilton sought to develop "a more convincing measure of the liquidity effect." 2 Rather than attempting to identify the effect of monetary policy over a month or quarter, Hamilton investigated the effect of an exogenous shock to the supply of reserves on the funds rate at the daily frequency.
Reasoning that a reserve supply shock is analogous to an exogenous open market operation, a significant response of the funds rate to a reserve supply shock is prima facie evidence that the Fed can generate changes in the funds rate through open market operations. The existence of a statistically significant and qualitatively important daily 1 Hamilton (1997) , p. 80. 2 Hamilton (1997), p. 80. liquidity effect would suggest the relevance of the liquidity effect at lower frequencies where it is much more difficult to isolate. Of course, the converse is true. Finding a weak and qualitatively unimportant daily liquidity effect casts doubt on its importance at frequencies more relevant for monetary policy. Hence, the existence and magnitude of the daily liquidity effect has important implications for monetary policy.
Noting several shortcomings in Hamilton's methodology, Thornton (2001a) found that Hamilton's result was the consequence of a few days when there were uncharacteristically large changes in the federal funds rate. Using Hamilton's procedure, he also found no evidence of a liquidity effect for sample periods before and after Recently, Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) (hereafter, C&D) find "clear evidence of a liquidity effect at the daily frequency." 4 Moreover, they find that the estimated size of the liquidity effect is economically meaningful. Unlike Hamilton, who used one component of autonomous factors that affect supply and estimated the supply shock, C&D have all of the autonomous factors that affect reserve supply and have the actual error made by the staff of the Board of Governors in forecasting these factors. They argue that their reserve-supply-shock measure is both more comprehensive than
Hamilton's and represents the actual shocks to reserves that occurred in carrying out open market operations.
Given the importance of the liquidity effect and the uncertainty about its importance empirically, I investigate the daily liquidity effect using C&D's measure. In so doing, I point out that (a) this measure does not necessarily reflect the reserve supply shocks made by the Fed in the conduct of open market operations, and (b) this measure does not mitigate the other criticisms of Hamilton's methodology and, hence, of C&D's.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the evidence on the daily liquidity effect prior to C&D. Section 3 presents C&D's analysis and shows why it does not overcome the concerns raised by Thornton (2001a) . A detailed analysis of the daily liquidity effect using C&D's reserve-supply-shock measure is presented in Section 4. The conclusions and implications are presented in Section 5.
The Daily Liquidity Effect
Each day the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter, the Desk) estimates the quantity of reserves that banks will demand over a two-week maintenance period, conditional on the target for the federal funds rate and the quantity of reserves that will be supplied if the Desk conducts no open market operations that day. 5 If the former exceeds the latter, the operation procedure suggests that the Desk add
reserves through an open market purchase. If the former is smaller than the latter, the procedure suggests that reserves be drained through an open market sale.
An important ingredient to the operating procedure is the estimate of the supply of reserves due to autonomous factors that affect supply-the float, currency in circulation, Second, Thornton (2001a) noted that there is a two-day lag in the "contemporaneous" accounting system that the Fed introduced in March 1984.
Specifically, banks satisfy their reserve requirements by holding reserves over a twoweek maintenance period ending Wednesday, while banks' reserve requirements are based on deposit balances that banks hold over a two-week period ending two days earlier-the second Monday of the maintenance period. Thornton (2001a) argued that because of this two-day lag, the demand for reserves is perfectly interest inelastic on the last two days of the maintenance period. Consequently, he suggested it is impossible to estimate the slope of the demand curve (the essence of the liquidity effect) on settlement Tuesday or settlement Wednesday.
Analyses by Clouse and Dow (2002) and Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002) show that Thornton's implication need not hold if individual banks behave optimally with respect to the reserve carryover provision. If banks follow such procedures, it would be possible to estimate the slope of the demand curve on the last two days of the maintenance period. These models ignore the costs of operating such a procedure which are likely to be large relative to the cost satisfying a reserve shortfall at the end of the 6 See Thornton (2001b) for an explanation of why -1.0 is the correct theoretical value of the coefficient. 7 This implication is confirmed by Thornton (2004 is an empirical issue that will be addressed.
Third, Thornton (2001a) noted that reserve requirements are based on the averaged holdings reserves over the fourteen days of the two-week maintenance period.
The large changes in the funds rate that tend to occur on settlement Wednesdays are due to an imbalance between the aggregate reserves demanded by all banks, on average over the maintenance period, and the aggregate amount of reserves supplied by the Fed over the period. Consequently, shocks to reserves will cause large changes in the funds rate only if they are large enough to create an imbalance between the aggregate reserve supply and aggregate reserve demand. Since a one-day shock to the Treasury's balance contributes only one-fourteenth to the weekly-average imbalance, Thornton (2001a) suggested that it would take a very large shock to the Treasury's balance on the last day of the maintenance period to generate a large maintenance-period-average reserve imbalance. The implication is that the statistically significant response of the funds rate that Hamilton finds on settlement-Wednesday is due either to relatively large shocks to the Treasury's balance on settlement Wednesdays or it is spurious-the consequence of a few relatively large settlement-Wednesday changes in the funds rate. Thornton (2001a) finds that Hamilton's settlement-Wednesday effect is due to just six of the sixty-nine settlement Wednesdays in his sample period. When these observations are accounted for, there is no statistically significant liquidity effect on settlement Wednesday or any other day of the maintenance period. Moreover, using
Hamilton's methodology, he found no statistically significant negative response of the funds rate to reserve supply shocks for sample periods before and after Hamilton's. Thornton (2001a) then attempted to estimate the liquidity effect using an alternative methodology. Specifically, he estimated the reduced-from equation of nonborrowed reserves obtained from a structural model of the reserve market (Thornton, 2001b) . If open market operations were responsible for changes in the funds rate, there should be a statistically significant change in nonborrowed reserves on days when it would have implemented changes in Fed's target for the funds rate. Thornton (2001a) found a statistically significant but quantitatively very small response before 1994 but not after. He concluded that there was "little support" for the daily liquidity effect.
The Daily Liquidity Effect à la Carpenter and Demiralp
C&D attempt to overcome some of the issues raised by Thornton (2001a) 
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Moreover, using does nothing to alleviate Thornton's (2001a) other criticisms. Specifically, given the uncertainty about reserve demand on the last two days of the maintenance period, the extent to which the liquidity effect can be estimated on settlement Tuesdays or Wednesdays is in doubt. More specifically, the statistically significant coefficients that C&D obtain on settlement Tuesday and Wednesday are not necessarily evidence of "a daily frequency liquidity effect…the reciprocal of the partial derivative of the demand for balances with respect to the funds rate,"-i.e., 1/ BOG t miss β , where β is the slope of the demand curve for reserves-as C&D contend.
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Furthermore, it remains true that it takes a large settlement Wednesday shock to the Treasury's balance to generate an aggregate imbalance on settlement Wednesday.
Because is more comprehensive than the measure Hamilton used, it is reasonable to assume that large shocks will occur more frequently. The shocks range from -$ 6.78 billion to $ 9.34 billion, and the average absolute value of , $ 0.79 billion, is fifty percent larger than the average absolute error in forecasting the Treasury's balance. However, one-day shock contributes only one-fourteenth to the aggregate maintenance period shock. Other things the same, the largest one-day shock is equivalent to a $ 0.66 billion aggregate maintenance period shock. It seems likely that a shock of Thornton (2004) has also shown that these three estimates of the Treasury's balance are independent and weighted nearly equally in the optimal forecast. 10 C&D, p. 13.
this magnitude could account for the large spikes in the funds rate that are associated with the close of the maintenance period.
Finally, unlike Hamilton (1997) and Thornton (2001a) 
The Daily Liquidity Effect
This section analyzes the relationship between and There was also an enormous reserve supply shock of more than $30 billion on September 13, 2001. Hence, this observation was also deleted. The last two days of 1986, when there were extremely large "window dressing" increases in the funds rate, were also deleted. 
EGARCH Estimates of the Liquidity Effect
The analysis employs an EGARCH (1, 1) model similar to that estimated by C&D. The EGARCH model, which is in the class of autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) models developed by Engle (1982) 
where t Z is a 1-by-vector of observable variables that determine the evolution of the variance and m δ is a corresponding m -by-1 vector of coefficients. The coefficient ψ allows for the possibility of asymmetry in the response shocks to the funds rate.
Because ARCH models account for heteroskedasticity, they produce estimates of β that are generally more efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS C&D include a variable for the expected change in the funds rate target on the day before a target change and the unexpected target change on the day of a target change.
The expectations are implied from the federal funds futures market using the procedure suggested by Kuttner (2001) . The federal funds futures contract was introduced in October 1988 and, hence, these variables would not be available for the entire sample period and are not used in this analysis. Because the coefficient on * t ff ∆ summarizes the effect of an unexpected target change, the change in the funds rate target ( Table 1 reports the estimates of the coefficients of (1) and (2) The estimates of the parameters of (2) are broadly similar to those reported by C&D. As expected, the coefficient on rr ∆ is positive and significant for both the normal and Student's t specifications. Likewise, as expected, the coefficients on and are negative, with the absolute value of the coefficient of the former being smaller than that of the latter. The estimated coefficients for the White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent, OLS specification are negative for all but one day, but are statistically significant for only four of the ten days during the maintenance period. Also, the estimated coefficients for the OLS specification are much larger in absolute value than the corresponding EGARCH estimates. This is due to the fact that OLS is influenced by the extreme observations, while EGARCH tends to down-weight these observations. All three of the estimates of β in Table 1 are consistent, and all three procedures generate consistent estimates of the variances. Hence, asymptotic theory provides no basis for preferring one set of estimates over another. While the sample size is very large-4499 observations-the number of observations on each day of the maintenance period is much smaller. Moreover, with the exception of the last two days of the maintenance period, there is no particular reason to expect the response to be different on average for a particular day in the maintenance period. Given this fact, together with the sensitivity of the EGARCH estimates to the distribution assumption and the marked difference between the OLS and EGARCH estimates noted in Table 1 , it seems reasonable to estimate the response for a group of days rather than each day of the maintenance period separately. Consequently, the days of the maintenance period are partitioned into the last two days (L2D) and the other eight days (NL2D).
Also, any effect of a supply shock on the funds rate will be distorted on days when the funds rate target is changed. Consequently, the sample is partitioned by days when the funds rate target is changed ( The results for on days when the target was not changed on the last two days of the maintenance period are somewhat mixed. The coefficients are relatively large and statistically significant for both the EGARCH-normal and OLS specifications, but small and not statistically significant for the EGARCH-Student's t specification. There is clear evidence of a statistically significant response on the other eight days of the maintenance period; however, the size of the response differs greatly between the two EGARCH specifications and, of course, between either of the EGARCH specifications and OLS. Indeed, for the EGARCH-normal specification, the estimated response appears to be statistically significant, but economically unimportant. 
The Impact of Outliers
Thornton (2001a) found Hamilton's results to be sensitive to six observations when there were large changes in the funds rate that happened to occur on days when there were unusually large shocks to Hamilton's reserve-supply-shock measure. Three of the six observations occurred during the turbulent period following the surprise reductions in reserve requirements in December 1990. Using Thornton's (2001a) criterion of a change in the funds rate of 80 basis points or larger, there were 33 days when basis points and | $1 billion, in the direction consistent with the liquidity effect. These observations are presented in Table 3 . A priori, there is no reason to single out days when there are unusually large changes in the funds rate.
However, eight of these (shaded in The results are summarized in Table 4 . To conserve space, only the estimates for the various partitions of are presented along with the corresponding marginal significance levels. These results indicate that the statistically significant effect of large BOG t miss shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period in the OLS specification, reported in Table 2 , is due entirely to these outliers. The coefficient on the outliers is -15.892 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient on the remaining days is -0.157 and not statistically significant at even the 20 percent level. The EGARCH-estimated coefficient for large shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period was not statistically significant for the Student's t distribution in Table 2 and remains so when the shocks are partitioned. The estimates for both outliers and nonoutliers are negative and statistically significant for the normal distribution; however, the estimate is nearly 23 times larger for the 16 outliers (-32.938 versus -1.457).
Estimates for other than the last two days of the maintenance period are also affected by outliers. For the OLS estimates both coefficients are statistically significant; The results for the OLS or EGARCH-Student's t specification suggest that there is no statistically significant response of the funds rate to supply shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period when outliers are accounted for. For the remaining eight days of the maintenance period, with the exception of the 17 outliers, large shocks to the supply of reserves have a relatively small, although statistically significant, effect on the funds rate. Indeed, the estimates from the OLS and EGARCH-Student's t specifications are remarkably similar, -0.754 and -0.701, respectively. For the EGARCH-normal specification, the estimated liquidity effect is much smaller and not statistically significant.
The Temporal Stability of the Estimated Liquidity Effect
If the statistically significant reaction of the funds rate to supply shocks is a true liquidity effect, it should be stable over time, as there is no particular reason to believe that the funds rate should respond to reserve supply shocks during some periods but not others. On the other hand, because the response of the funds rate on the last two days of the maintenance period depends on the reserve market conditions at the time of the shock, one might expect this response to vary significantly over time. On settlement days when there is a surfeit of reserves, a large negative supply shock will have little or no effect on the funds rate. On days when reserves are particularly scarce, the same shock might generate a relatively large response in the funds rate. Also, recall also that it takes a relatively large reserve shock to have much of an affect on the aggregate reserve imbalance. For both of these reasons, one might expect to see considerable temporal variation in the response of the funds rate on the last two days of the maintenance period.
Because of the likely sensitivity of the response to shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period and to investigate the temporal robustness of the funds rate to supply shocks on other days in the maintenance period, the OLS and EGARCHStudent's t model are estimated with rolling regressions of 600 observations. 17 The nearly 30-month window should be sufficiently long to yield relatively precise estimates of the parameters as well as capture any significant time variation in the effect of reserve supply on the funds rate.
Estimates of the response of the funds rate to small shocks on days when the target was not changed for the OLS and EGARCH-Student's t models are presented in Figures 3 and 4 , respectively. The estimated coefficients are represented by the solid line, and dashed lines represent plus or minus two standard errors. The estimates are plotted on the last day of the sample period. As before, the standard errors for the OLS estimates are obtained using White's heteroskedastic-consistent procedure. These figures
show that the conclusion from Table 2 -the response of the funds rate to small supply shocks is not statistically significant-is robust to the sample period. The estimated coefficients range from negative to positive values for both specifications and are rarely statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Figures 5 and 6 present the OLS and EGARCH estimates, respectively, for large shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period for days when there were no outliers. The effect of these 16 outliers on the OLS estimates is demonstrated by presenting the estimates (shown in red) with these observations included. The EGARCH-Student's t estimates including the outliers is not presented because the estimates were relatively insensitive to the presence or absence of these observations. Consistent with the findings of the previous section, with the exception of a brief period in the late 1990s, the estimated coefficients for the OLS specification are not statistically significant. Moreover, as expected, the effect of the 16 outliers is dramatic.
maintenance period exhibits extreme volatility, at times switching quickly from large positive to large negative values.
When these observations are not excluded, the estimated response becomes larger, particularly so during the period following the surprise reduction in reserve requirements.
While the estimated coefficient is most often negative, it is statistically significant only for a brief period in the late 1990s.
Like the OLS estimates, the EGARCH estimates suggest that the effect of supply shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period is temporally unstable. Indeed, there is an abrupt change in the estimated coefficient in early 1994. Unlike the OLS estimates, however, there are three periods where the response is statistically significant.
The estimated coefficients on all but the last two days of the maintenance period are presented in Figures 7 and 8 . The OLS estimates are more often than not negative, but are statistically significant only for a brief period in the late 1990s. Again, the OLS estimates are very sensitive to the 17 outliers. The response is much larger when these observations are included.
The parameter estimates for the EGARCH estimates follow a pattern similar to, but somewhat more stable than, the OLS estimates. Moreover, the estimated coefficients are generally statistically significant since the late 1990s, but not before.
The results presented here suggest three conclusions. First, C&D's finding that the funds rate responds only to large shocks is robust-only large reserve supply shocks matter.
Second, the response of the funds rate to large shocks on settlement Tuesdays and Wednesdays appears to be the consequence of unusually large changes in the funds rate that sometimes occur on those days. This conclusion is strongly supported by the OLS estimates, but less so by the EGARCH estimates.
Third, once the effect of settlement Tuesdays and Wednesdays and unusually large changes in the funds rate are accounted for, the response of the funds rate to large reserve supply shocks appears to statistically significant sometime after the mid-1990s
but not before.
To further investigate these conclusions, the three models were estimated separately for the period January 2, 1986 -August 31, 1995, and the period September 1, 1995 -January 30, 2004. The break was chosen by the change from statistical insignificance to statistical significance in Figure 8 , allowing for the fact that the data are plotted on the last day of the sample of 600 observations. The results are presented in Table 5 . Again, to conserve space only the estimates for the various partitions of are presented along with the corresponding marginal significance levels. Large forecast errors on days when there were no changes in the funds rate target are partitioned into the 33 days where there are outliers ( O ) and all other days ( ).
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BOG t miss NO All three conclusions are strongly supported by these estimates. First, consistent with the results presented in Figure 3 and 4, the effect of small shocks to reserves is not statistically significant in either period for any of the three specifications.
Second, with the exception of days identified as outliers, the federal funds rate did not respond significantly to large shocks that occurred on the last two days of the maintenance period during either sub-period. Hence, the relatively large settlement Tuesday and Wednesday response reported by C&D appears to be due to a few observations when there were unusually large changes in the federal funds rate that are likely caused by other events. 18 That is, is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 on the 33 days listed in Table 3 and zero otherwise.
is 1 when is zero and is zero when O is 1.
O NO O
Finally, with the exception of the few outliers, there is no statistically significant response of the funds rate to large shocks on the other days of the maintenance period before September 1995. This result is robust across specifications. The response is statistically significant after August 1995; however, the estimated magnitude of the response on days when there are no outliers is small, ranging from about a third of a basis point for the EGARCH-normal specification to just over a basis point for OLS. There is a large, statistically significant response of the funds rate on days identified as outliers;
however, because these observations occur when there are unusually large changes in the funds rate, it is questionable whether these responses should be considered as evidence of a liquidity effect. The liquidity effect should occur on all days and not merely on days when there are unusually large changes in the funds rate for other reasons.
Summary and Conclusions
The daily liquidity effect was first investigated by Hamilton (1997) and subsequently by Thornton (2001a) . The evidence suggests a weak and economically unimportant liquidity effect at the daily frequency. Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) have reopened the issue using a reserve-supply-shock measure that is both more comprehensive than that used by Hamilton and Thornton and more closely approximates the errors that the Fed actually made in carrying out open market operations. This paper investigates the daily liquidity effect using this measure over an extended sample period.
The evidence indicates that once the effect of changes in the funds rate target, the last two days of the maintenance period, and a few extreme observations are taken into consideration, there is a small but statistically significant response of the federal funds rate to this reserve-supply-shock measure after August 1995 but not before. This is encouraging but not convincing evidence of a daily liquidity effect for two reasons. First, because this measure only approximates the true reserve supply shock from open market operations, the estimates suffer from the usual stochastic regressor problems. While the effect of this problem on the magnitude of the response cannot be determined without additional information, generally speaking, the effect on the standard error is to overstate, to some undetermined degree, the precision of the estimate.
Consequently, we cannot be certain that the estimated response of the funds rate reported here is a measure of the true daily liquidity effect. Indeed, the fact that the response is not statistically significant before mid-1995 and that the magnitude of the effect is small thereafter may account for why, in Hamilton's (1997) words, "it is very difficult to find convincing proof that this This lack of a daily liquidity effect may not seem all that remarkable nowadays because many analysts (e.g., Friedman, 1999 Friedman, , 2000 Goodhart, 2000; Guthrie and Wright, 19 See Thornton (2006a) for the size of open market operations for the period 1983-1996. 20 Hamilton (1997 Hamilton ( ), p. 80. 2000 Taylor 2001; and Woodford, 2000) suggest that central banks control the overnight rate through what Guthrie and Wright (2000) have called open mouth operations, or Goodhart (2000) has termed open mouth policy. As long as market participants believe the Fed can control the federal funds rate through open market operations, such operations are unnecessary.
These results are remarkable for the period before the Fed began announcing its target for the funds rate, however. Not only was the funds rate target not announced, but Thornton (2006b) shows that the FOMC concealed the fact that it was targeting the funds rate. Consequently, the Fed could not have controlled the funds rate through open mouth operations during this period-a liquidity effect was essential. Consequently, the results presented here raise important questions about why the funds rate is so close to the funds rate target during this period.
One possibility for the confluence of relatively modest open market operations and large and persistent changes in the funds rate is the possibility that most target changes are endogenous-the Fed adjusts its target whenever the equilibrium short-term rate changes. Woodford (2000) and Friedman (2000) 
